If a class of games is known to have a Nash equilibrium with probability values that are either zero or Ω(1) -and thus with support of bounded size -then obviously this equilibrium can be found exhaustively in polynomial time. Somewhat surprisingly, we show that there is a PTAS for the class of games whose equilibria are guaranteed to have
1 n ) -values, and therefore large -Ω(n) -supports. We also point out that there is a PTAS for games with sparse payoff matrices, a family for which the exact problem is known to be PPAD-complete [6] . Both algorithms are of a special kind that we call oblivious: The algorithm just samples a fixed distribution on pairs of mixed strategies, and the game is only used to determine whether the sampled strategies comprise an -Nash equilibrium; the answer is "yes" with inverse polynomial probability (in the second case, the algorithm is actually deterministic). These results bring about the question: Is there an oblivious PTAS for finding a Nash equilibrium in general games? We answer this question in the negative; our lower bound comes close to the quasi-polynomial upper bound of [18] .
Another recent PTAS for anonymous games [13, 14, 7] is also oblivious in a weaker sense appropriate for this class of games (it samples from a fixed distribution on unordered collections of mixed strategies), but its running time is exponential in 1 . We prove that any oblivious PTAS for anonymous games with two strategies and three player types must have 1 α in the exponent of the running time for some α ≥ 1 3 , rendering the algorithm in [7] (which works with any bounded number of player types) essentially optimal within oblivious algorithms. In contrast, we devise a poly(n) · (1/ ) O(log 2 (1/ )) non-oblivious PTAS for anonymous games with two strategies and any bounded number of player types. The key idea of our algorithm is to search not over unordered
INTRODUCTION
Is there a polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) for computing approximate Nash equilibria? This has emerged, in the wake of the intractability results for Nash equilibria [9, 5] , as the most central question in equilibrium computation. Over the past three years there has been relatively slow progress towards smaller 's [10, 11, 4, 21] -so slow that it is hard to believe that a PTAS is around the corner. On the other hand, [13, 14] provide a PTAS for the important special case of anonymous games with a bounded number of strategies (those for which the utilities of the players, although different, depend on the number of players playing each strategy, not on the identities of the players that do). This PTAS proceeds by discretizing the probabilities in the mixed strategies of the players to multiples of 1 k , for appropriate integer k, and works even in the generalization in which the players are divided into a bounded number of types, and utilities depend on how many players of each type choose each strategy.
In this paper we report significant progress on this important algorithmic problem; we present several new algorithms, but also the first nontrivial lower bounds. We start by pointing out two new interesting classes of bimatrix games 1 that have PTAS's:
• It was shown in [6] that computing a Nash equilibrium for the special case of sparse games, that is, games whose payoff matrices have a bounded number of nonzero entries in each row and column [6] , is PPADcomplete. We point out that there is a trivial PTAS -in particular, the pair of uniform mixed strategies works. This is interesting in that this is the first PPAD-complete case of a problem that is so approximable.
• We also give a randomized PTAS for small probability games, that is, games that are guaranteed to have Nash equilibria with small O( 1 n ) nonzero probability values, and thus with linear support (Theorem 3).
It is quite surprising that games with small probability values (our second special case above) are easy, since games with large (bounded from below by a constant) probability values are also easy. What probability values are difficult then? Our next result, a lower bound, seems to suggest inverse logarithmic probability values are hard (compare with the quasi-PTAS of [18] , whose equilibria have roughly logarithmic support).
To explain our negative result, we first note that both PTAS's outlined above (as well as those for anonymous games discussed later) are oblivious. This means that they have access to a fixed set of pairs of mixed strategies, in the generic case by sampling, and they look at the game only to determine whether a sampled pair of strategies constitutes an approximate Nash equilibrium. Is there an oblivious PTAS for the general Nash equilibrium? The answer here is a definite "no" -in fact, we proved our negative result after we had been working for some time on developing such an algorithm. . . We show that any oblivious algorithm must sample at least Ω " n (.8−34 ) log 2 n " pairs in expectation (Theorem 4). For comparison, [18] 's algorithm takes time n O(log n/ 2 ) .
Another important class of games for which a PTAS was recently discovered is that of anonymous games with two strategies [13, 7] . These are multi-player games, in which the utility of each player depends on the strategy (0 or 1) played, and the number of other players playing strategy 1 (not their identities). In fact, the PTAS works even in the more sophisticated case in which the players are partitioned into types, and the utilities depend on the number of players of each type playing strategy 1. The PTAS in [13] , and the relatively more efficient one in [7] , both have running times that are exponential in 1 . They are also oblivious in a sense appropriate for anonymous games, in that they work by sampling an unordered set of n mixed strategies, where n is the number of players, and they only look at the game in order to determine if there is an assignment of these strategies to the players that results in an approximate equilibrium. We prove that any oblivious approximation algorithm, for anonymous games with two strategies and three player types, must sample an exponential-in 1 -sized collection of unordered sets of mixed strategies -and so our PTAS's are near-optimal.
Finally, we circumvent this negative result to develop a non-oblivious PTAS which finds an -approximate Nash equilibrium in anonymous games with two strategies and any players, but in what follows we only discuss the two-player, or bimatrix, case.
bounded number of player types in time poly(n)`1
This algorithm is based (in addition to many other insights and techniques for anonymous games) on a new result in applied probability which is, we believe, interesting in its own right: Suppose that you have two sums of n independent Bernoulli random variables, which have the same first moment, the same second moment, and so on up to moment d. Then the distributions of the two sums have variational distance that vanishes exponentially fast with d, regardless of n. To turn this theorem into an algorithm, we discretize the mixed strategies of the players using techniques from [7] and, in the range of parameters where the algorithm of [7] breaks down, we iterate over all possible values of the first log(1/ ) moments of the players' aggregate behavior; we then try to identify, via an involved dynamic programming scheme, mixed strategies, implementing the given moments, which correspond to approximate Nash equilibria of the game. Our approximation guarantee for sums of independent indicators is rather strong, especially when the number of indicators is small, a regime where Berry-Esséen type bounds provide weaker guarantees and result in slower algorithms [13, 7] . It is quite intriguing that a quasi-polynomial time bound, such as the one we provide in this paper, shows up again in the analysis of algorithms for approximate Nash equilibria (cf. [18] ).
Preliminaries
A two-player, or bimatrix, game G is played by two players, the row player and the column player. Each player has a set of n pure strategies, which without loss of generality we assume to be the set [n] := {1, . . . , n} for both players. The game is described then by two payoff matrices R, C corresponding to the row and column player respectively, so that, if the row player chooses strategy i and the column player strategy j, the row player gets payoff R ij and the column player C ij . As it is customary in the literature of approximate Nash equilibria, we assume that the matrices are normalized, in that their entries are in [−1, 1].
The players can play mixed strategies, that is, probability distributions over their pure strategies which are represented by probability vectors x ∈ R n + , |x|1 = 1. If the row player chooses mixed strategy x and the column player mixed strategy y, then the row player gets expected payoff x T Ry and the column player expected payoff x T Cy. A pair of mixed strategies (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium of the game G = (R, C) iff x maximizes x T Ry among all probability vectors x and, simultaneously, y maximizes x T Cy among all y . It is an -approximate Nash equilibrium iff x T Ry ≥ x T Ry − , for all x , and, simultaneously, x T Cy ≥ x T Cy − , for all y . In this paper, we will use the stronger notion of -approximately well-supported Nash equilibrium, or simply -Nash equilibrium. This is any pair of strategies (x, y) such that, for all i with x i > 0, e T i Ry ≥ e T i Ry − , for all i , and similarly for y. That is, every strategy i in the support of x guarantees expected payoff e T i Ry which is within from the optimal response to y, and similarly every strategy in the support of y is within from the optimal response to x.
An anonymous game is in a sense the dimensional dual of a bimatrix game: There are n players, each of which has two strategies, 0 and 1. For each player i there is a utility function
is the utility of player i when s/he plays strategy s ∈ {0, 1}, and k ≤ n−1 of the remaining players play strategy 1, while n − k − 1 play strategy 0. In other words, the utility of each player depends, in a player-specific way, on the strategy played by the player and the number of other players who play strategy 1 -but not their identities. The notions of Nash equilibrium and -Nash equilibrium are extended in the natural way to this setting. Briefly, a mixed strategy for the i-th player is a function A more sophisticated kind of anonymous games divides the players into t types, so that the utility of player i depends on the strategy played by him/her, and the number of players of each type who play strategy 1.
PTAS FOR TWO SPECIAL CASES

Small Games
We say that a class of bimatrix games is small if the sum of all entries of the R and C matrices is o(n 2 ). One such class of games are the k-sparse games [6] , in which every row and column of both R and C have at most k non-zero entries. The following result by Chen, Deng and Teng shows that finding an exact Nash equilibrium remains hard for k-sparse games:
)-Nash equilibrium in 10-sparse normalized bimatrix games with n strategies per player is a PPAD-complete problem.
In contrast, it is easy to see that there is a PTAS for this class:
Theorem 2. For any k, there is a PTAS for the Nash equilibrium problem in k-sparse bimatrix games.
Our original proof of this theorem consisted in showing that there always exists an -Nash equilibrium in which both players of the game use in their mixed strategies probabilities that are integer multiples of /2k. Hence, we can efficiently enumerate over all possible pairs of mixed strategies of this form, as long as k is fixed. Shang-Hua Teng pointed out to us a much simpler algorithm: The pair of uniform mixed strategies is always an -Nash equilibrium in a sparse game! The difference with our algorithm is this: the uniform equilibrium gives to both players payoff of at most k/n; our algorithm can be used instead to approximate the payoffs of the players in the Nash equilibrium with the optimal social welfare (or more generally the Nash equilibrium that optimizes some other smooth function of the players' payoffs).
Small Probability Games
If all games in a class are guaranteed to have a Nash equilibrium (x, y), where the nonzero probability values in both x and y are larger than some constant δ > 0, then it is trivial to find this equilibrium in time n ), probability values? Clearly, exhaustive search over supports is not efficient anymore, since those have now linear size. Surprisingly, we show that any such class of games has a (randomized) PTAS, by exploiting the technique of [18] . , and similarly for y; that is the probability mass of the distributions x and y spreads non-trivially over a subset of size Ω(n) of the strategies. Hence, small probability games comprise a subclass of linear support games, games with an equilibrium (x, y) in which both x and y assign to a constant fraction αn of the strategies probability at least 1/βn, for some constants α and β. However, this broader class of games is essentially as hard as the general: take any Nash equilibrium (x, y) of a normalized game and define the pair (x , y ), where Proof. We show first the following (stronger in terms of the type of approximation) variant of the theorem of Lipton, Markakis and Mehta [18] . The proof is given in the full version of this paper. 
Definition 1 (Small Probability Games). A bimatrix game
G = (R, C) is of δ-small probabilities, for some constant δ ∈ (0, 1], ifx := (1 − 5 ) · x + 5 ·`1 n , 1 n , . . . ,
|e
Suppose now that we are given a normalized bimatrix game G = (R, C) of δ-small probabilities, and let (x, y) be an equilibrium of G in which
, for all i ∈ [n], and similarly for y. Lemma 1 asserts that, if a multiset 2 A of size t = 16 log n/For this we define the set A of good multisets for the row player as The reason for defining A and B in this way is that, given two multisets A ∈ A, B ∈ B, the uniform distributions X over A and Y over B comprise an -Nash equilibrium (see the full version of the paper for a detailed justification).
What remains to show is that, with inverse polynomial probability, a random multiset A belongs to A and a random multiset B belongs to B. To show this we lower bound the cardinalities of the sets A and B via the following claim, proven in the full version of this paper. We argue that the subset of A containing elements that could arise by sampling x is large: indeed, with probability at least 1 − 4 n , a multiset sampled from x belongs to A and, moreover, each individual multiset has small probability of being sampled, since x spreads the probability mass approximately evenly on its support.
Claim 1. The sets A and B satisfy
Given Claim 1, we can show Claim 2; the proof is given in the full version of this paper. Equation (1) implies that the algorithm that samples two uniformly random multisets A , B and forms the uniform probability distributions X and Y over A and B respectively, succeeds in finding an -Nash equilibrium with probability inverse polynomial in n. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
Claim 2. If X , Y are the uniform distributions over random multisets A and B then
Prˆ(X , Y ) is an -Nash equilibrium= Ω " δ 2 · n −32 log(1/δ)/ 2 " .(1)
A LOWER BOUND FOR BIMATRIX GAMES
The two PTAS's presented in the previous section are oblivious. An oblivious algorithm looks at the game only to check if the various pairs of mixed strategies it has come up with (by enumeration or, more generally, by random sampling) are -approximate, and is guaranteed to come up with one that is with probability at least inverse polynomial in the game description. More formally, an oblivious algorithm for the Nash equilibrium problem is a distribution over pairs of mixed strategies, indexed by the game size n and the desired approximation . It is a PTAS if for any game the probability that a pair drawn from the distribution is anNash equilibrium is inversely polynomial in n. Notice that, since we are about to prove lower bounds, we are opting for the generality of randomized oblivious algorithms-a deterministic algorithm that enumerates over a fixed set of pairs of mixed strategies can be seen as a (randomized) oblivious algorithm by considering the uniform distribution over the set it enumerates over.
The rather surprising simplicity and success of these algorithms (as well as their cousins for anonymous games, see the next section) raises the question: Is there an oblivious PTAS for the general Nash equilibrium problem? We show that the answer is negative.
Theorem 4. There is no oblivious PTAS for the Nash equilibrium in bimatrix games.
Proof. We construct a super-polynomially large family of n × n games with the property that every two games in the family do not share an -Nash equilibrium. This quickly leads to the proof of the theorem.
Our construction is based on a construction by Althöfer [1] , except that we need to pay more attention to ensure that the -Nash equilibria of the games we construct are "close" to the exact Nash equilibria. For even and n =` /2´, we define a family of n × n two-player games G S = (RS, CS), indexed by all subsets S ⊆ [n] with |S| = . Letting {S 1, S2, . . . , Sn} be the set of all subsets of S with cardinality /2, we imagine that column j of the game G S corresponds to subset Sj. Then, for every j, we fill column j of the payoff matrices R S and CS as follows:
• for all i / ∈ S, RS,ij = −1 and CS,ij = 1;
• for all i ∈ Sj, RS,ij = 1 and CS,ij = 0; and
In other words, our construction has two components: In the first component (defined by the rows labeled with the elements of S), the game is 1-sum, whereas in the second (corresponding to the complement of S) the game is 0-sum with the row player always getting payoff of −1 and the column player always getting payoff of 1. The payoffs of the first component are more balanced in the following way: as we said, every column corresponds to a subset S 1 . . . , Sn of S of cardinality /2; if the column player chooses column j, then the row player gets 1 for choosing a row corresponding to an element of S j and 0 for a row corresponding to an element in S \ S j . Lemma 2 (see proof in the full version of the paper) provides the following characterization of the approximate equilibria of the game G S : in any -Nash equilibrium (x, y), the strategy x of the row player must have 1 distance at most 8 from u S -the uniform distribution over the set S. That is, in all approximate equilibria of the game the strategy of the row player must be close to the uniform distribution over S. Formally, y) is an -Nash equilibrium of the game G S , where x is the mixed strategy of the row player and y that of the column player, then the following properties are satisfied by x:
2. 1(x, uS) ≤ 8 , where uS is the uniform distribution over S, and 1(x, uS) represents the 1 distance between distributions x, u S .
The proof of the first assertion is straightforward: the row player will not assign any probability mass to the rows which give her −1, since any row in S will guarantee her at least 0. Since all the activity happens then in the first component of the game, which is 1-sum, an averaging argument implies that both players' payoff is about 1/2 at equilibrium. Observe further that, for a given mixed strategy of the row player, the strategy of the column player that guarantees her the highest payoff is the subset containing the /2 elements of S to which the row player assigns the smallest probability mass. Hence, if the probability distribution of the row player were far from uniform, then, contrary to what we argued, the corresponding payoff for the column player would be larger than 1/2-this is established via a delicate geometric argument for 1 distances of probability measures.
Suppose now that there is an oblivious PTAS for the Nash equilibrium, that is, a distribution D over pairs of mixed strategies such that, for any game G S , the probability that an -approximate Nash equilibrium is sampled is inverse polynomial in n. Let us consider the probability distribution D R induced by D on the mixed strategies of the row player and denote by B S the 1 ball of radius 8 around u S . Lemma 2 implies that DR should be assigning probability mass at least inverse polynomial in n to each ball B S , S ⊆ [n], |S| = . This is impossible, since by the following claim there is a super-polynomial number of disjoint such balls. The proof of the claim is via a counting argument given in the full version of this paper. 
A LOWER BOUND FOR ANONYMOUS GAMES
Recall the definition of anonymous games from Section 1.1. In [13] we give a PTAS for anonymous games with two strategies, running in time n
2 ) , and in [7] a more efficient one, with running time
2 ) . (In [14] we also give a much more sophisticated PTAS for anonymous games with more than two strategies). All these PTAS's have 1 in the exponent of the running time, and they work even if there is a fixed number t of types (in which case t multiplies the exponent). Furthermore, it turns out that all of these algorithms are oblivious, in a specialized sense appropriate for anonymous games defined next.
An oblivious -approximation algorithm for anonymous games with n players is defined in terms of a distribution, indexed by n, on unordered n-tuples of mixed strategies. 3 The algorithm samples from this distribution, and for each {p 1, . . . , pn} sampled, it determines whether there is an assignment of these probabilities to the n players such that the resulting strategy profile (with each player playing strategy 1 with the assigned probability) is an -approximate Nash equilibrium; this latter test can be carried out by max-flow techniques, see, e.g., [13] . The expected running time of this approximation algorithm is then the inverse of its probability of success.
We show the following result, implying that any oblivious -approximation algorithm for anonymous games whose expected running time is polynomial in the number of players must have expected running time exponential in ( 1 ) 1/3 . Hence, our PTAS from [7] is essentially optimal among oblivious PTAS's.
Theorem 5. For any constant c ≥ 0, < 1, no oblivious -approximation algorithm for anonymous games with 2 strategies and 3 player types has probability of success larger than n −c · 2
We only sketch the proof next and postpone the details for Appendix A. We first show the following: given any ordered n-tuple (p 1, . . . , pn) of probabilities, we can construct a normalized anonymous game with n players of type A, and two more players of their own type, such that in any -Nash equilibrium of the game the i-th player of type A plays strategy 1 with probability very close (depending on and n) to p i. To obtain this game, we need to understand how to exploit the difference in the payoff functions of the players of type A to enforce different behaviors at equilibrium, despite the fact that in all other aspects of the game the players of group A are indistinguishable.
The construction is based on the following idea: For all i, let us denote by μ −i := P j =i pj the target expected number of type-A players different than i who play strategy 1; and let us give this payoff to player i if she plays strategy 0, regardless of what the other players are doing. If i chooses 1, we give her payoff t where t is the number of players different than i who play 1. By setting the payoffs in this way we ensure that (p 1, . . . , pn) is in fact an equilibrium, since for every player the payoff she gets from strategy 0 matches the expected payoff she gets from strategy 1. However, enforcing that (p 1, . . . , pn) is also the unique equilibrium is a more challenging task; and to do this we need to include two other players of their own type: we use these players to ensure that the sum of the mixed stategies of the players of type A matches P p i at equilibrium, so that a player i deviating from her prescribed strategy p i is pushed back towards pi. We show how this can be done in Appendix A.1. We also provide guarantees for the -Nash equilibria of the resulting game.
The construction outlined above enables us to define a family of 2 Ω(1/ 1/3 ) anonymous games with the property that no two games in the family share an -Nash equilibrium, even as an unordered set of mixed strategies. Then, by an averaging argument, we can deduce that for any oblivious algorithm there is a game in the ensemble for which the probability of success is at most 2 −Ω(1/ 1/3 ) . It is important for our construction to work that the anonymous game defined for a given collection of probability values (p 1, p2, . . . , pn) does not deviate too much from the prescribed set of mixed strategies p 1, p2, . . . , pn even in an -Nash equilibrium. The bound of 2 
A QUASI-POLYNOMIAL PTAS
We circumvent the lower bound of the previous section by providing a PTAS for anonymous games with running time polynomial in the number of players n times a factor of ( 1 ) O(log 2 1 ) . The PTAS is, of course, non-oblivious, and in fact in the following interesting way: Instead of enumerating a fixed set of unordered collections of probability values, we enumerate a fixed set of log(1/ )-tuples, representing the first log(1/ ) moments of these probability values. We can think of the these moments as more succinct aggregates of mixed strategy profiles than the unordered collections of strategies considered in [7, 13] , since several of these collections may share the same moments. To put the idea into context, let us recall the following theorem.
Theorem 6 ( [7, 8] This structural result can be turned into an oblivious PTAS using max-flow arguments (see [7] ). At its heart the proof of the theorem relies on the following intuitive fact about sums of indicator random variables: If two sums of independent indicators have close means and variances, then their total variation distance should be small. The way this fact becomes relevant to anonymous games is that, if there are 2 strategies per player, then the mixed strategy of a player can be described by an indicator random variable; and as it turns out, if we replace one set of indicators by another, the change in payoff that every player will experience is bounded by the total variation distance between the sum of the indicators before and after the change. Nevertheless, the bound obtained by approximating the first two moments of the sum of the Nash equilibrium strategies is weak, and the space of unordered sets of probability values that we need to search over becomes exponential in 1/ .
To obtain an exponential pruning of the search space, we turn to higher moments of the Nash equilibrium. We show the following theorem, which provides a rather strong quantification of how the total variation distance between two sums of indicators depends on the number of their first moments that are equal. 
Condition (C d ) considers the power sums of the expectations of the indicator random variables. Using the theory of symmetric polynomials we can show that (C d ) is equivalent to the following condition on the moments of the sums of the indicators (for the proof see the full version of the paper):
Theorem 7 provides then the following strong approximation guarantee for sums of indicator random variables, that we think should be important in other settings. Our result is related to the classical moment method in probability theory [15] , but to our knowledge it is novel and significantly stronger than known results:
If two sums of independent indicators with expectations bounded by 1/2 have equal first d moments, then their total variation distance is 2 −Ω(d) .
It is important to note that our bound in (2) does not rely on summing up a large number of indicators n. This is quite critical since the previous techniques break down for small n's-for large n's Berry-Esséen type bounds are sufficient to obtain strong guarantees (this is the heart of the probabilistic results used in [13, 7] ). The proof of Theorem 7 (and its complement for probability values in [1/2, 1)) is given in the full version of this paper. It proceeds by expressing the distribution of the sum of n indicators, with expectations p 1, . . . , pn, as a weighted sum of the binomial distribution B(n, p) (with p =p = P p i/n) and its n derivatives with respect to p, at the value p =p (these derivatives correspond to finite signed measures). It turns out that the coefficients of the first d terms of this expansion are symmetric polynomials with respect to the probability values p 1, . . . , pn, of degree at most d; hence, from the theory of symmetric polynomials, each of these coefficients can be written as a function of the power-sum symmetric polynomials P i p i , = 1, . . . , d (see, e.g., [22] ). So, if two sums of indicators satisfy Condition (C d ), the first terms cancel, and the total variation distance of the two sums depends only on the other terms of the expansion (those corresponding to higher derivatives of the binomial distribution). The proof is concluded by showing that the joint contribution of these terms is inverse polynomial in 2 Ω(d) . Our algorithm, shown below, exploits the strong approximation guarantee of Theorem 7 to improve upon the algorithm of [7] in the case where only O(1/ 3 ) players mix at the -Nash equilibrium (this corresponds to case 1 in Theorem 6). The complementary case (case 2 in Theorem 6) can be treated easily in time polynomial in n and 1/ by exhaustive search and max-flow arguments (see [7] ).
Algorithm Moment Search
Input:An anonymous game G, the desired approximation . Output: An -Nash equilibrium of G in which all probabilities are integer multiples of 1 k 2 , where k = c and c is universal (independent of n) constant, determined by Theorem 6. For technical reasons that will be clear shortly, we choose a value for k that is by a factor of 2 larger than the value required by Theorem 6; this is the value k that guarantees an /2-Nash equilibrium in multiples of 1/k 2 . Finally, we assume that we have already performed the search corresponding to Case 2 of Theorem 6 for this value of k and we have not found an /2-Nash equilibrium. So there must exist an /2-Nash equilibrium in which at most k 3 players randomize in integer multiples of 1/k 2 .
1. Guess integers t 0, t1, ts, t b ≤ n, ts + t b ≤ k 3 , where t 0 players will play pure strategy 0, t1 will play pure strategy 1, t s will mix with probability ≤ 1 2 , and t b = n − t0 − t1 − ts will mix with probability > 1 2 . (Note that we have to handle low and high probabilities separately, because Theorem 7 only applies to indicators with expectations in (0, 1/2]; we handle indicators with expectations in (1/2, 1) by taking their complement and employing Theorem 7-see the full version for the precise details.)
,
) .
For all , μ represents the -power sum of the mixed strategies of the players who mix and choose strategies from the set {1/k 2 , . . . , 1/2}. Similarly, μ represents the -power sum of the mixed strategies of the players who mix and choose strategies from the set 
, will be determined later.
3.
For each player i = 1, . . . , n, find a subset
ff of permitted strategies for that player in an 2 -Nash equilibrium, conditioned on the guesses in the previous steps. By this, we mean determining the answer to the following: "Given our guesses for the aggregates t 0, t1,
, what multiples of 1/k 2 could player i be playing in an /2-Nash equilibrium?" Our test exploits the anonymity of the game and uses Theorem 7 to achieve the following:
• if a multiple of 1/k 2 can be assigned to player i and complemented by choices of multiples for the other players, so that the aggregate conditions are satisfied and player i is at 3 /4-best response (that is, she experiences at most 3 /4 regret), then this multiple of 1/k 2 is included in the set S i;
• if, given a multiple of 1/k 2 to player i, there exists no assignment of multiples to the other players so that the aggregate conditions are satisfied and player i is at 3 /4-best response, the multiple is rejected from set S i.
Observe that the value of 3 /4 for the regret used in the classifier is intentionally chosen midway between /2 and . The reason for this value is that, if we only match the first d moments of a mixed strategy profile, our estimation of the real regret in that strategy profile is distorted by an additive error of /4 (coming from (2) and the choice of d). Hence, with a threshold at 3 /4 we make sure that: a. we are not going to "miss" the /2-Nash equilibrium (that we know exists in multiples of 1/k 2 by virtue of our choice of a larger k), and b. any strategy profile that is consistent with the aggregate conditions and the sets S i found in this step is going to have regret at most 3 /4+ /4 = . The fairly involved details of our test, and the way its analysis ties in with the search for an -Nash equilibrium is given in the full version of this paper.
4. Find an assignment of mixed strategies v 1 ∈ S1, . . ., v n ∈ Sn to players, such that:
• t 0 players are assigned value 0 and t1 players are assigned value 1;
• t s players are assigned a value in (0, 1/2] and
• t b players are assigned a value in (1/2, 1) and
. Solving this assignment problem is non-trivial, but it can be done by dynamic programming in time
, because the sets Si are subsets of {0, 1/k 2 , . . . , 1}. The algorithm is given in the full version of the paper. Sketch: Correctness follows from this observation: The results in [7] and the choice of k guarantee that an 2 -approximate Nash equilibrium in discretized probability values exists; therefore, Step 3 will find non-empty S i's for all players (for some guesses in Steps 1 and 2, since in particular the /2-Nash equilibrium will survive the tests of Step 3-by Theorem 7 and the choice of d, at most /4 accuracy is lost if the correct values for the moments are guessed); and thus Step 4 will find an -approximate Nash equilibrium (another /4 might be lost in this step). The full proof and the running time analysis are provided in the full version of this paper.
DISCUSSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
The mystery of PTAS for Nash equilibria deepens. There are simple algorithms for interesting special cases well within reach, and in fact we have seen that the existence of a PTAS is not incompatible with PPAD-completeness. But oblivious algorithms cannot take us all the way to the coveted PTAS for the general case. In the important special case of anonymous games, the approach of [13, 14, 7] -by design involving oblivious algorithms -hits a brick wall of ( 1 ) 1 α , but then a more elaborate probabilistic result about moments and Bernoulli sums breaks that barrier. Pseudopolynomial bounds, familiar from [18] , show up in approximation algorithms for anonymous games as well.
Many open problems remain, of course:
• Is there a PTAS for Nash equilibria in general games? A PTAS for bimatrix games that exploits the linear programming-like nature of the problem would not be unthinkable.
• Find a truly practical, and hopefully evocative of strategically interacting crowds, PTAS for anonymous games with two strategies.
• Prove that finding an exact Nash equilibrium in an anonymous game with a finite number of strategies is PPAD-complete.
• Find a PTAS for 2-strategy graphical games -the other important class of multi-player games.
• Alternatively, it is not unthinkable that the graphical games special case above is PPAD-complete to approximate sufficiently close. 
APPENDIX
A. THE LOWER BOUND FOR OBLIVIOUS PTAS'S FOR ANONYMOUS GAMES
A.1 Constructing Anonymous Games with Prescribed Equilibria
, where tA is the number of players of type A who play strategy 1; • u 
Proof of Claim 4:
Let μ = P i∈ [k] qi. Suppose for a contradiction that in a δ -Nash equilibrium μ > μ + 3δk; then 1
Note however that E[u
. Hence, the above implies 
Hence, in a δ -Nash equilibrium with δ < δ, it must be that
. This is a contradiction since we assumed that μ = P i∈ [k] qi > μ + 3δk, and μ is non-negative. Via similar arguments we show that the assumption μ < μ − 3δk also leads to a contradiction. Hence, in every δ -Nash equilibrium with δ < δ, it must be that
We next show that in every δ -Nash equilibrium with δ < δ, at least one of the players B and C will not include strategy 1 in her support. But we assumed that we fixed a δ -Nash equilibrium with δ < δ; hence the last equation implies that qi = 0. But this leads quickly to a contradiction since, if q i = 0, then using Claim 4 we have
where we also used that pi ≥ 3δk. The above inequality contradicts our assumption that μ −i > μ −i + δk. Hence, (5) must be satisfied. Using that μ ≤ μ + 3δk, which is implied by Claim 4) we get
From the above discussion it follows that qj ≤ pj + 4δk, for all j.
Now fix i ∈ [k] again. Summing (6) over all j = i, we get that
Combining (5) and (7) we get
To conclude the proof of Theorem 9, we combine Claims 4 and 6, as follows. For every player i ∈ [k], we have from Claims 4 and 6 that in every δ -Nash equilibrium with δ < δ, μ −i = μ−i ± 4δk 2 and μ = μ ± 3δk.
By combining these equations we get qi = pi ± 7δk 2 .
A.2 The Lower Bound
Given Theorem 9, we can establish our lower bound.
Proof of Theorem 5:
Let us fix any oblivious -approximation algorithm for anonymous games with 2-strategies and 3-player types. The algorithm comes together with a distribution over unordered sets of mixed strategies-parametrized by the number of players n-which we denote by D n. We will consider the performance of the algorithm on the family of games specified in the statement of Theorem 9 for the following setting of parameters: We show first the following about the shareability of -Nash equilibria among the games G P , P ∈ T k .
Claim 7. If, for P, Q ∈ T k , d(P, Q) > 0, then there is no -Nash equilibrium that is shared between the games G P and GQ in unordered form.
